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Summary. It is starting from the role recognized and attributed to nature by Schelling and Nietzsche that one 
understands the renewed relationship between being and time at the basis of the possibility for the new beginning 
of Western philosophy, prophesized by Heidegger in 1936. For both, the possibility of the very future passes by 
the necessary redemption of the past (that is an extreme liberation from its conceptual hypostatization) through 
a form of love for the All, which is possible to recognize only with a philosophy of nature that is able to show the 
“unprethinkable” ground of being and its eternal dynamics as potential potentiae. Only on the basis of this potentia 
potentiae of the “unprethinkable” past, the “coming event” of the future becomes possible, as well as that renewed 
relation between time and being, which permits a new beginning for Western philosophy.
Keywords: nature, freedom, future, Nietzsche, Schelling.
Ateitis, arba apie gamtos atpirkimą po Schellingo ir Nietzsche’ės
Santrauka. Pradedant nuo vaidmens, kurį gamtai pripažįsta ir priskiria Schellingas ir Nietzsche’ė, yra suprantamas 
atnaujintas būties ir laiko santykis, tapęs 1936 metais Heideggerio pranašautos naujos Vakarų filosofijos pradžios 
galimybės pagrindu. Abiejų filosofų požiūriu, pačios ateities galimybė apeina būtiną praeities atpirkimą (tai yra 
visišką išsilaisvinimą iš jos konceptualaus hipostazavimo) per meilės Visybei formą, kurią galima atpažinti tik 
iš gamtos filosofijos, galinčios parodyti savo neapmąstomą / neatmenamą (unvordenkliches) būties pagrindą ir jo 
amžiną dinamiką kaip potentia potentiae. Tik remiantis neapmąstomos / neatmenamos praeities potentia potentiae 
yra įmanomas ateities „ateinantis įvykis“ ir atnaujintas būties ir laiko santykis, sudarantis naujos Vakarų filosofijos 
pradžios galimybę.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: gamta, laisvė, ateitis, Nietzsche, Schellingas.
When Martin Heidegger prophesises the possibility of a new beginning for Western phi-
losophy, after the failures of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Friedrich Nietzsche 
(Heidegger 1971: 31), he maintains that the new beginning must derive from the very 
understanding of the reasons for such failures. He does not fully specify what it consists 
of – though it is evident how he considers his thinking perfectly capable of such “news” – 
he rather alludes to the underground reasons (to discover and understand) determining 
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the end of a certain philosophical tradition and accompanying Schelling and Nietzsche 
up to their respective speculative peaks and subsequent collapses. 
In Schelling, as in Nietzsche, what impedes the definition of a complete system of 
knowledge surely lies in the surplus of Wollen with respect to ratio aiming to grasp and 
describe reality. It is in that Wanting which is completely resolved in reason that they both 
recognise that dynamic of being, which resists the imposition of concepts that include 
everything at once. In the wanting that returns onto itself, but is always able to open up 
to new horizons of thought, there actually lies the fundamental reason for the failure of 
Western philosophy and its possible, desirable neuer Anfang: a new beginning that is not 
resolved in a sole theoretical solution, since the “new beginning” is first and foremost the 
possibility of ein neues Denken, but a new thinking that can have multiple results and 
manifestations and takes effect from the renewed relationship between being and time, 
insisting, in particular, on the latter and thinking of the former not as an inert noun but 
rather in a verbal sense, as suggested by Franz Rosenzweig (see Rosenzweig 1925). The 
“new thinking” is able to live in the relationship between time and being, as being always 
and only occurs in time, in its temporality, and a thought that wishes to speak adequately 
of being cannot of course isolate it into a concept, caging and immobilizing what it 
always becomes, making time a simple dimension where it is possible to take a snapshot 
that displays its meaning: philosophy is not simply a “knowing” that nails its object so 
it can discuss it; rather, philosophy is “love,” a “tension” toward “wisdom,” where one 
must, as Schelling states in his Erlangen Vorlesungen, understand wisdom (Weisheit) as a 
knowing that is also – mainly – practical: in this sense, new thinking, in that it appears 
in full continuity with the etymological origin of the word philo-sophy, cannot of course 
be realised in a “new” conceptual articulation; rather, it should make itself concrete, 
practical, it must live in the tension to wisdom and effectively be in practice, as only here 
can it perform that overcoming which it resuggests realizing; on the other hand, in just 
recognizing the surplus of Wollen with respect to ratio, this deep reason for the double 
shipwreck of rational science announced in Schelling and Nietzsche as a possibility for 
overcoming, one already reaches the necessary ethical reconsideration of the theories. 
When, in 1936, Heidegger speaks of a new beginning for Western thinking, he must 
have in mind the cultured being in its occurrence, that is, being as an event (Ereignis); 
after all, his philosophical production, following the so-called “turn” (die Kehre), as he 
himself admitted, revolves around the concept of Ereignis. However, it is not correct to 
think of Heidegger’s “prophecy” as held alongside Schelling and Nietzsche, limiting it to 
a consideration of almost biographical character, as if Heidegger’s thinking were the only 
one to set out into the open furrow of that double crisis, and only therein would the sole 
possible new start for Western philosophy be completed. What Heidegger prophesizes 
really regards Western thinking in general, in that after Schelling and Nietzsche (especially 
after the latter, if we look at the history of effects), a philosophical season opens that cannot 
do without rethinking the time-being relationship and which finds its most significant – 
and controversial – “synthesis” in relation to the becoming character of nature, but above 
all with science, which investigates it with continued success. 
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If the approach of a new form of Naturphilosophie, for example with Henri Bergson 
and Alfred North Whitehead, is set as the attempt to think “philosophically” about the 
becoming of nature (where it is still possible), a progressive exhaustion of philosophical 
tension appears to play out in the philosophy of science. In some ways, philosophy as 
knowing, or rather as merely rational science, actually dies out in science; it could not be 
otherwise. In the face of the successes of science, philosophy is reduced to repeating it, 
if anything trying elegant rhetorical formulations that do not however modify anything 
of the results that science continues to deliver; here one spontaneously thinks of how 
dismissively Schelling writes his introduction to Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature regard-
ing such a “philosophical” attitude, when he states that nothing is more disheartening 
for philosophy than the attempt to expound the results of science philosophically. Nor 
can philosophy think, with a conservative, retrospective attitude, of resorting to the 
more comfortable humanistic culture, appealing, for example, “to poets” for the search 
for another “foundation,” in the hope of dissolving it as an “artistic” (f )act but lacking 
that tension toward wisdom it should constantly be admiring. Here one would still and 
always live within a separation that inevitably is nihilistic. Philosophy as art is not an 
alternative to philosophy as Wissen, if art is taken as a flight from the rational rather than 
a practice “founded” on the tension toward wisdom, that is, on liberty itself. In Schelling 
and Nietzsche, philosophy is rediscovered as a tension toward wisdom, and art is recog-
nized and completed as a creative act that continues the “productivity” of nature itself 
in its “products” and so remains perfectly faithful to the inspiration that is the property 
of philosophizing. 
Science does not obliterate philosophy; in fact, philosophy can learn a lot therefrom. 
Philosophy is hardly terminated by contemporary Wissen-schaft and its results, which 
put the foundations of classical reasoning themselves into crisis. Philosophy does not die 
with science; if anything dies, it is philosophy exclusively understood as Wissenschaft: what 
enters crisis and dies is the philosophical project that intended to perform in the rational-
ism of German Idealism, meaning the systematic project for a rational “knowing,” which 
intends to describe being in its totality, mostly resolving its becoming in the movement 
of the Concept itself; deep down, what dies is the misunderstood negative philosophy, 
which dares to grasp All in the progressive synthetic definition of potency-to-be and does 
not care for the (logical) groundlessness that presides over existence, characterizing the 
abysmalness (and un-prethinkableness) of becoming of nature; but in its successes, sci-
ence manages to show (negative) philosophy the unsustainability of its position and the 
reason that states and considers it; and with science, that passage to positive that Schelling 
prepares is performed and realized in practice, “philosophically,” as the inevitable result 
of reason that instigates its own limits, and recognizes it as possible starting from the 
“willingness” exceeding reason.  
What enters crisis with Schelling and Nietzsche per philosophica documenta is repeated 
and highlighted in the results of contemporary science – with even greater effectiveness, if 
possible: the model and foundations of classical reason enter crisis, and the risk philosophy 
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runs into is a flight into irrationalism, since this crisis of reason seems unable to resolve 
itself in a rational “synthesis” that is more capable than the one that yields, as it requires 
an inversion beyond the limits of reason itself: what Schelling calls an ecstasy of reason, 
that is, reason exiting its “place.”
With the crisis of reason, announced philosophically in the systematic limits of Schelling 
and Nietzsche and produced concretely with the continued successes of contemporary 
science, philosophy still keeps its most intimate meaning: indeed, it is not simply science 
(Wissenschaft, as German Idealist thinkers, among others, define it), so cannot be confused 
with it and become extinct with it; nor is philosophy just the aspiration to knowing (be 
it scientific or not). It is something more: it is the tension toward “wisdom,” which is 
more clearly different with respect not only to knowing but also to wisdom itself; the 
proprium of philo-sophy lies precisely in that tension, in that continuous effort toward 
wisdom that is never “perfect,” complete knowing, but actually coincides with liberty 
itself, never objectifiable from the sole Subject we belong to. 
Wissen, which is completed in science, has the merit of leading (negative) philosophy 
up to its very limits, which are of course not the limits of the knowable but the limits of 
reason, which “objectifies” what it intends to know and ends up separating thought and 
action irredeemably. It is possible to go beyond those limits, unless you conserve a classical 
rational setting, since it is not recognized as part of the same Subject that creates itself 
while knowing – as occurs for Schelling with Naturphilosophie, where philosophizing on 
nature means exactly creating nature itself (Schelling 1799: 5) – but simply as a subject 
that demands to objectify what it wishes to know and recognizes itself in action, always 
within a contraposition. In contemporary science, the “from being to becoming” passage 
is progressively completed, from negative philosophy (Wissen) to positive philosophy 
(Weisheit), in that it is realized as a knowing that is also practical and creates actively 
participating in/from the Subjectivity of nature. But while Science acts the passage without 
the need to establish it “rationally,” philosophy must recognize and document it and so 
seek its legitimate theoretical foundation. As tension to wisdom, (positive) philosophy is 
foremost designed for the overall “theoretical foundation” of the Positive.
Nietzsche’s position in this regard does not constitute a problem, as his “gay” Science 
does not demand the presence of God (or rather foundation), and the passage to “posi-
tive” is reassumed in the continual aspiration to the Overman as a figure alluding to the 
future connected to the Dyonisiac past of nature. But for Schelling, the problem is more 
complicated, since the idea of God remains indispensable, and the relation with “positive” 
cannot do without historical Revelation. In Nietzsche, the “Godless, redeemed” nature 
of The Gay Science completes the “Death of God” and is, as an abyss (not foundation) of 
the past, able to constitute the (not metaphysical) “presupposition” to overcome the pas-
sive, nihilistic condition that believes in the “metaphysical foundation.” In Schelling, the 
question is not so simple, as for him the dynamic process of nature ends with implying 
and introducing the need for “creation,” and the positive is not taken into the chaotic 
dynamism of nature but the becoming relationship with God. It is in the same philosophy 
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of nature that one “philosophically” reaches the need to recognize an original creative act. 
In the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, the passage from negative to positive philosophy 
was completed within its phases. As it turns to the foundation of the existing in general, 
Naturphilosophie is primarily a positive philosophy in that it recognizes a “free act” of 
creation as an indemonstrable presupposition for its natural process: it does introduce God.
Schelling’s early nature-philosophy already stressed the need to eliminate the “concept” 
of original being (Schelling 1799: 11), moving from the unconditioned of being itself 
and indeed recognizing in this conditioned something “positive,” free, and unfounded 
that would later be described as a free initial act of becoming-being. The description of 
the dynamic process, in that it in some ways placed the original act of the unconditioned 
into parentheses, limiting itself to building material, still ran the risk of presenting the 
development of nature as a necessary, mechanical process. From this, one understands 
how such a philosophy, however speculative in method, could still appear as a form of 
negative, or simply ideal, philosophy, having as its object the Potency-to-be and not the 
positive of the becoming Existent. However, in Einleitung in die Philosophie of 1830, re-
considering the relationship between the philosophy of nature and the “positive,” Schelling 
specifies how Naturphilosophie, despite not being (completely yet) positive philosophy, 
constitutes its, so to speak, “natural border,” since it excludes original being as a concept 
and recognizes it as a free act. Philosophy of nature takes into account the existence of 
an eternally becoming world but recognizes it with a free start conferring liberty to all 
its manifestations (as we can see in the final lessons in philosophy from 1844, where the 
constructing material completes and realizes that foundation of the “positive” which 
remained but an ideal in the other attempts in Munich and Berlin). 
All nature tells us that it does not exist in any way through a purely geometrical necessity; 
in it there is not only pure reason, but personality and spirit [...]. Creation is not an actual 
circumstance, but an act (Schelling 1809; SW, I/7: 396). 
In Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, the text where Schelling 
investigates liberty starting from its “natural roots,” he breaks the “circle of necessity” 
(Schelling 1989: 71) that early philosophy of nature illuminated but was not yet able to 
break and interrupt and imposes the thinking of a free (unconditioned) start of creation 
that will later be taken up and developed in Weltalter, and yet again in the attempts to 
establish positive philosophy. 
But since it is not yet understood metaphysically, creation is introduced and explained 
by Schelling as “merely accidental” (hence free), and God is never described as an “initial” 
position but as free “becoming” that is accompanied from the start of being. Here, one 
really must think of God outside of an ontological conception, recognizing God’s becom-
ing and admitting, as a presupposition for God Itself, the “abyss of the past” – already 
always won and overcome in God – that is nature.
It is precisely starting from the role recognized and attributed to nature by Schelling 
and Nietzsche that one understands the renewed relationship between being and time 
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at the basis of the possibility for new thought and hence a new beginning for Western 
philosophy starting from these two authors. 
The combination of Schelling and Nietzsche, proposed, for example, by Karl Löwith 
in his 1935 book, passes exactly through the affinity he spots between the original liv-
ing (das Urlebendige) in the Weltalter of Schelling and the doctrine of its eternal return 
in Nietzsche. Though Schelling’s description is directly involved with a “cosmogonical 
construction,” while the doctrine of the eternal return is presented as an extreme pos-
sibility faced after the death of God. Hence, it is presented as an extreme possibility in 
history or, if we like, at its climax, what Nietzsche presents in Dionysus’s mirror (WzM, 
fr. 1067) to clarify that the “nature” of the world, given back to the “return,” has a lot 
in common with the abyss of the past, eternally returning onto itself from the original 
living described in the Weltalter of Schelling. Löwith states:
To speak with Nietzsche the original primordial living being [...] is something complete-in-it-
self and completely-rounded, concluded and brought to an end, containing in itself, in equal 
measure, the original power that destroys and creates. “Prime nature” is a continuous cycle, a 
rotary movement without stopping, start or end. Original being wants nothing but itself, it is a 
being-in-itself (Löwith 1935: 151). 
Similarly, for Schelling – as Löwith states too – “original, primigenial being has nothing 
that precedes it and nothing outside itself, so it must develop purely by itself and of its own 
volition.” In both cases, the abysmalness of nature, its continual revolving, is ordered by 
a will (Wille zur Macht for Nietzsche, pure Wollen for Schelling), which is always able to 
activate a new start freely. 
Superficially reading, it may seem there is a substantial difference between the concep-
tion of nature proposed by Schelling and that suggested by Nietzsche. While the latter 
seems to describe a chaotic, rule-free nature, Schelling is clear in stating that the neces-
sary revolution of nature, though still lacking freedom of the start that comes in later, 
responds to the wanting-it-itself “not without laws but according to only one law”: a law 
which we know anticipates the one to profile itself successively as the organic scheme of 
freedom after the start. But on closer inspection, Nietzsche also recognizes to the return-
ing movement of Dyonisiac nature a sort of “law” at the moment he makes it clear that 
the image he shows in Dionysus’s mirror is nothing but “will to power,” that is, what the 
intellect can say about the world as will to power: a Chaos des Alls – just as the general 
character of the world described in The Gay Science (fr. 110) – which is not an absence 
of rule, since the “law” of that Chaos is precisely the returning onto itself that the will 
to power describes. In fact, the will to power is a willpower toward a higher, continuous 
will: self-conservation (Selbsterhaltung) and continuous development (Potenzierung) are 
the objectives leading willpower and, at the same time, the effects it produces within a 
returning “dynamic” that guarantees the eternal willpower (conceptually repeating the 
eternal Mögen of Schelling), starting from which every “free” new start is possible.
The will, which for Schelling as for Nietzsche, lies at the base of the “nature” that pre-
cedes every start is the same will that is harbored at the bottom of man’s soul. Schelling’s 
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cosmogonical description harks straight back to the Mit-wissenschaft (cum-scientia) of 
creation present in man: the past of nature that precedes the free start of being is the same 
abyss of past that is harbored at the depth of man. In this sense, even the Nietzschean 
“decision” for eternal return can only be based on an original Mit-wissenschaft: to lead 
everything back to Dionysiac becoming, accepting the extreme possibility of the eternal 
return, one needs an “awareness,” an original Dionysian knowledge; one must be able 
to recognize oneself as a tension toward a wisdom removed by acting and continuing in 
practice toward the future. 
The Dyonisiac past to which Nietzsche exhorts is what man in his modern condition 
has lost in nihilistic drifting and what should now be regained. “The highest elevation of 
awareness of one’s power [Kraft-Bewußtsein] in man is what creates the superman” (Will 
to Power, No. 1060): the superman is the Typus who puts forward the renewed, hoped-for 
relationship with the world as Chaos des Alls, but the Übermensch is also – especially – the 
sign of a freedom already present in the need for that incessant becoming commanded 
by that will to power, a sense of becoming hidden in that blind returning that should 
be reawakened in the aspiration to the future, able to convert the past of nature from 
“foundation” to “presupposition”: what makes up the redemption and “Godlessness” of 
nature announced by the death of God, which must, for Nietzsche, be continued and 
pursued “philosophically” (which also means ethically) in the tension to the Übermensch. 
Indeed, how can a man make himself eternally becoming? If he can, the faculty of 
realizing himself as becoming, which is the freedom to start, must reside therein. But 
Nietzsche does not hesitate to describe this freedom as conditioned by the dusk of the 
individual himself, as separated and distinct from the becoming of All. By virtue of a 
superior awareness, man is free to start anew, but only deciding for himself the death of his 
universal condition. If the individual subject does not die, in no way can he pose himself 
as Übermensch: in his Kraft-Bewußtsein, man notices the will (to power) that equates him 
to the All, but to start anew and freely, he must give in to that will, he must make will to 
power for himself; so he must abandon will as “his” faculty, to merge therein that essence 
which binds him and equates him to the becoming All. For Nietzsche, within the will 
to power lies the possibility to pass to the “positive,” in will resides the net that connects 
man to All, in will dwells the possibility for every form and start that is produced in the 
Chaos des Alls and so, still in (only apparently “his”) will, man finds access to the de-cision 
from himself, that is, the “freedom” of a new start that returns man and his reason to the 
becoming of the will to power in continual tension to the Übermensch.
Despite all the differences that remain between the “positive” of Schelling and the 
“positive” of Nietzsche, for the philosopher of Leonberg, too, as one again reads in Les-
son XXIV of Exposition of Purely Rational Philosophy, it is will that plays a central role 
in making possible for man that exiting from himself that allows him to consider the 
existing “positively.” 
Access to positive philosophy is guaranteed by an act of will that exceeds the limits 
of thinking, since in that act the original, free act of creation repeats itself: precisely an 
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unprethinkable start which, for Schelling (as for Nietzsche, too), presupposes a “past” 
that excludes the idea of a creatio ex nihilo and yet confers freedom to the wheel of the 
creation of nature. Without that free start, the abyss of the past would be like an eternal, 
necessary returning of a will that which always and only wants itself, actually excluding 
any novitas: the past of the Weltalter is nature necessary in God. It needs a freedom that 
is external to itself to start and hence place the necessary nature as a past on which the 
present and future are founded. The free decision allows the absconditus God to reveal 
itself, that is, to make Itself history. Otherwise, It would remain necessity and abyss.
In the act of will, which for Schelling allows the passage from negative philosophy to 
positive philosophy, man lives and acts that original Mitwissenschaft of creation described 
in the Weltalter. The profound difference between the “positive” of Nietzsche and the 
“positive” of Schelling lies in recognizing to the act of will, which makes it possible and 
accessible, a different effect: while for Nietzsche, through the will to power, man rediscovers 
the Chaos (des Alls) in himself starting from that reassigned sense of becoming as infinite 
(theoretical but also practical) tension to the Overman, for Schelling, via the act of will, 
the free inversion to “positive” is performed, he recognizes himself as an integral, active 
part of a sole (unobjectifiable) Subject – and in this the difference from Nietzsche is not 
so great – but mainly, one recognizes the “positive” as an expression and development 
of a very precise history that is completed with the Revelation; outside of that, one can-
not, for Schelling, talk of a “positive.” This conserves the thought of a free creation by a 
post-metaphysical God, escaping a characterization of an ontotheological type, hence not 
being like a “steadfast foundation,” but like a becoming that proceeds in tandem with 
free creation on the basis of an original decision that makes the (initially) inert, abysmal 
past of nature the presupposition for the present and future of the revelation. And for 
Schelling, the Revelation is something very precise:
By Revelation, all we mean is Christianity. Indeed, the Revelation of the Old Testament is 
Christianity only as presentiment and prophecy, and is only understood in Christianity or 
through it. Now, the actual content of Christianity is entirely the Person of Christ; this is 
together the link of the Old and New Testament. Indeed, the final, own content of the Old 
Testament is the Messiah. One can then say: in a philosophy of Revelation we mean only, or 
eminently, understanding the Person of Christ (Schelling 1841-42; SW, II/4: 35).
For Schelling, the positive is totally resolved in Revelation, and its philosophical content 
consists of understanding the person of Christ, while we can say that the positive for 
Nietzsche lies in the redemption of the past, in the tension to the Future, in regaining 
the Chaos des Alls, removed and veiled by the Apollonian will to power, possible in the 
continual aspiration to the Overman. 
Perhaps one may maintain that for both of the thinkers positive philosophy consists 
of welcoming the being as the becoming and so as time, or rather of a “new thinking” 
that stops responding to Ist-fragen to become one with historic becoming in acting: for 
Nietzsche, it means putting into practice an act to live and continue the tension to the 
Overman, and for Schelling, a practice to align itself to the Revelation of Christ and 
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hence conform with the love of God for Its Son and for men. For both, the Law to build 
upon as a guide to practice is Love, and for both, the possibility of the future passes by 
the redemption of the past through a form of love for the All.
As Stéphane Mosès suggests in his work Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz 
Rosenzweig, the Star of Redemption in some way repeats the steps of Ages of the World by 
Schelling, describing the past as an unprethinkable time of the Urwesen preceding creation, 
the present as the time of revelation, and finally, the future as the era of redemption that 
is completed in man’s acting. Rosenzweig probably believed that in Schelling, revelation 
would resolve the time of creation and redemption into one, but one may surely state 
that in love for the created and the other one responds, in Schelling too, to the love of 
the creator that is revealed. Love passes through the three times, redeeming the inert 
past that precedes the free creation of the start, freeing to the becoming of the future. As 
is obvious, there is no creation to save in Nietzsche, nor is there a revelation to narrate, 
yet we can still rebuild an articulation into three times on the basis of the redemption 
of the past to which Nietzsche refers with the eternal return of the same: the past of the 
Dionysiac Urwesen, which precedes the Apollonian separation and the false, nihilistic 
unifications produced should first be saved by a work of unmasking that is reassumed in 
the death of God, as present of our époque, and successively redeemed in acceptance of 
the eternal return of the same and in the continual tension to the future of the Overman. 
Here, too, what saves and redeems the past is a love for All, which is in Schelling made 
manifest in the free act of creation and in the revelation where God gives humanity Its 
Son, and in Nietzsche, it is completed by welcoming and loving the eternity that accepts 
the return and from which one can still wish to have children, that is, generate the future 
of the Overman.
The past is known [gewußt], the present cognised [erkannt], the future foreseen [geahndet]. 
The known is narrated [erzählt], the met portrayed [dargestellt]; the foreseen prophesised 
[geweissagt] (Schelling SW, I/8: 199). 
As one reads in the introduction to the Weltalter, the future is foreseen, and the foreseen 
is prophesized. Now, prophecy cannot but be based on an “occurred event”: it is on the 
basis of the “occurred event” of creation – or of the start – that the “coming event” is 
prophesized as a realization or a (re)appropriation of an Ereignis that “merges” on the 
already occurred, on its unpossessable freedom.
Both Schelling and Nietzsche exclude a beyond that precedes the Existing. The creatio 
ex nihilo is flatly excluded, and this means that that non-differentiable past of nature, 
that abyss of past, is in itself capable of a dynamic to activate the start freely. The non-
differentiable presupposition is not the simple surplus of a positum: it is actually dynamis, 
or, if we want to use an expression of Schelling from Berlin, it is potentia potentiae: an 
abysmal depth that guards in itself the faculty to start, to activate a contraction to trig-
ger the becoming-God and hence creation. On the basis of this potentia potentiae of the 
unprethinkable past, the “occurred event” of creation and revelation is possible – as is the 
Gamtos transformacijos ir antropologinis skirtumas: ontologija, etika, menas / 
Emilio Carlo Corriero. Future, or On the Redemption of Nature after Schelling and Nietzsche
17
“coming event” of a future which is so only in that it “merges” on the pre-supposition (on 
the abyss of the past) and frees it, actually redeems it, from its necessary, needful inertia. 
The “coming event,” or the events that will occur, are so in that they are realized in the 
reciprocal appropriation of time and being by means of love for the All: redemption is only 
possible when the being is free from time as its “cause” and when time is in turn redeemed 
by the being as its “dimension.” In time-being, or rather, in becoming, that redemption 
is completed in the way that was, for Schelling, prefigured in the Weltalter as the aspira-
tion to realize a “future objective exposition of science (philosophy)” in the form of the 
greatest poem of nature. It can embrace, in the link of the link, in the love for All that 
is the Copula, “what was, what is, what will be,” and which was actually, for Nietzsche, 
announced in the “historic” decision – as matured after the “death of God” – for the 
eternal return of the same, only possible through love for eternity, the only mother from 
whom, for Nietzsche, one may desire children to come – as we can read in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In both cases, the future event is prophesized on the impossible foundation 
of a natural past redeemed in the freedom of the start and recuperated in the moment 
of every decision to act which that start “recalls” as its known past and “continues” with 
love as its foreseen future as all still to be (re)created.
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